The Constitutionality of Request Notice Provisions in In Rem Tax Foreclosures by Friedman, Ellen F.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 56 Issue 6 Article 8 
1988 
The Constitutionality of Request Notice Provisions in In Rem Tax 
Foreclosures 
Ellen F. Friedman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ellen F. Friedman, The Constitutionality of Request Notice Provisions in In Rem Tax Foreclosures, 56 
Fordham L. Rev. 1209 (1988). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol56/iss6/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REQUEST NOTICE
PROVISIONS IN IN REM TAX FORECLOSURES
INTRODUCTION
The taxation of real property provides local governments with an es-
sential source of revenue.' Consequently, real property tax delinquency
is an urgent problem facing municipalities today.2 To collect past due
property taxes and discourage delinquency, states and municipalities rely
on tax sale or in rem tax foreclosure proceedings.3
Because these proceedings result in the loss of constitutionally pro-
tected property rights,4 they must satisfy the due process requirements5
of notice and an opportunity to be heard.6 State and municipal statutes
provide for various methods of alerting owners, mortgagees, and other
interested parties of impending tax sales and foreclosures. These meth-
ods include constructive notice7 by either publication8 or posting9 and
1. See Rosewell v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 99 111. 2d 407, 416, 459 N.E.2d 966,
970, appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1237 (1984). All fifty states and the District of Columbia
raise revenue by taxing real property. See Casenote, Constitutional Lan-Due Process-
Notice By Publication Is Constitutionally Inadequate in a Tax Sale Proceeding, 24 Wayne
L. Rev. 1463, 1464 & n. 11(1978). Although state governments also rely on the taxation
of real property, it serves primarily as a revenue-raising device for local governments. See
C. Harriss, Property Taxation in Government Finance 9, 11 (1974); J. Heilbrun, Urban
Economics and Public Policy 448, 468 (2d ed. 1981); Property Tax Reform 1 (G. Peter-
son ed. 1973); Godfrey, Enforcement of Delinquent Property Taxes in New York, 24 Alib.
L. Rev. 271, 280-81 (1960); Note, In Search of Due Process" Notice in New York Adminis-
trative Tax Sales, 61 St. John's L. Rev. 113, 113-14 (1986). For instance, in 1984, the
collection of property taxes provided over S92.5 billion in revenue to local governments,
but less than $4 billion of state government revenue. See Bureau of the Census, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, 1987 Statistical Abstract of the United States 253 (Chart No. 432)
(107th ed. 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Bureau of the Census Statistics].
2. See Rosewell v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 99 I11. 2d 407, 409, 459 N.E.2d 966,
967, appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1237 (1984); S. Olson & M. Lachman, Tax Delinquency
in the Inner City 1 (1976); P. Salins, The Ecology of Housing Destruction 112 (1980);
Daley & Meislin, New York City, the Landlord: A Decade of Housing Decay, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
3. For a discussion of tax sale and foreclosure procedures, see in fra notes 27-31 and
accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
6. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); McCann v. Scaduto, 71 N.Y.2d
164, 172, 519 N.E.2d 309, 311, 524 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (1987); 2 R. Rotunda, 1. Nowak &
J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 17.8, at 261 (1986) [hereinafter Rotunda].
7. Notice by publication or posting is considered constructive notice. See Mennon-
ite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798-99 (1983); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
8. A typical publication statute requires the state to cause notice of the tax sale,
including the description of the property to be sold, the name of the owner, and the
amount of taxes due, to be published in a newspaper. See, eg., N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law
§ 1002 (McKinney 1972); see also infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing stat-
utes that provide for publication).
9. Posting generally refers to displaying a notice of the tax sale, including the de-
scription of the property, the owner's name, and the amount of delinquent taxes, in the
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actual notice, generally by mail."° The Supreme Court has called into
doubt the constitutional sufficiency of publication and posting.' As a
compromise, several states have enacted "request notice" provisions,' 2
which condition the state's obligation to send notice by mail to interested
parties on the parties' having requested such notice beforehand.' a In
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,14 the Supreme Court expressly
left open the question of the constitutionality of these provisions.' 5
Since the Mennonite decision, several courts have been confronted
with cases involving request notice provisions. Some have taken the posi-
tion that these provisions violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment because they relieve the state of its obligation to provide in-
terested parties with actual notice.' 6 Others hold that these provisions
strike a reasonable balance between the state's need to collect delinquent
taxes in an economical manner and the interested parties' constitutional
right to receive notice prior to a proceeding that will affect their property
interests. 17
This Note argues that request notice provisions are constitutional.
Part I discusses the importance of real estate taxation to the financial
local courthouse. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-388A (1980) (notice to be posted
on the outside of the county treasurer's office); see also infra note 36 and accompanying
text (discussing statutes that provide for notice by posting).
10. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
11. The determination of whether or not a particular method of notice meets the
requirement of due process is made according to reasonableness under the totality of the
circumstances. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950); infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. Using the Mullane test, the Supreme
Court has found notice by publication insufficient in a variety of contexts. See Tulsa
Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988) (probate proceedings);
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983) (tax sale); Schroeder v.
City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211 (1962) (condemnation proceedings); Walker v. City
of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) (same); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315-16 (final settle-
ment of trust fund).
12. See infra note 44 (collecting statutes).
13. See Note, Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1257,
1268 (1957) [hereinafter Note, Requirements of Notice] (A request notice provision makes
notice by mail "contingent upon prior registration of [the interested party's] name and
address with the tax authorities."); Note, Constitutional Law-Tax Sales: Notice to Inter-
ested Parties, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 1091, 1098 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Law].
The notice provided by these statutes has been called "conditional." See Comment, Men-
nonite Board of Missions v. Adams: Insufficient Notice Under the New York In Rein
Statutes, 33 Buffalo L. Rev. 389, 407-08 (1984); Note, supra note 1, at 124 & n.50.
14. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
15. See id. at 793 n.2; infra note 104 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Wylie v. Patton, 111 Idaho 61, 65-66, 720 P.2d 649, 653-54 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1986); Town of Phillipsburg v. Block 22 Lots 14, 15, 16, 218 N.J. Super. 558, 564,
528 A.2d 98, 100 (1987); In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103
A.D.2d 636, 639-40, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (4th Dep't 1984).
17. See, e.g., Homemakers Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Jones, No. 83-1856, slip op. at 4 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 4, 1984); In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 227, 514 N.Y.S.2d
390, 394 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518 N.Y.S.2d
1030 (1987); In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d at 641,
481 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (Boomer, J., concurring).
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welfare of state and municipal governments and the use of the tax sale
and in rem tax foreclosure to collect delinquent property taxes. Part II
traces the development of the constitutional requirements for notice of
tax sales and other in rem proceedings. Part III examines the conflict in
the lower courts regarding the constitutionality of request notice provi-
sions, and concludes that request notice provisions strike a reasonable
balance between the practical and fiscal needs of municipalities and the
due process rights of property owners, mortgagees and other interested
parties.
I. TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY AND IN REM TAX
FORECLOSURES
The taxation of real property is an important source of revenue for
states and municipalities.' 8 Each year, state and local governments raise
billions of dollars through the taxation of real property. 9 Unfortunately,
property tax delinquency is rampant,2° particularly in major urban cen-
ters.21 Statistics indicate that tax delinquent properties nationwide
number in the hundreds of thousands' and that cities lose billions of
dollars in uncollected property taxes each year.3 Scholars and local gov-
ernment studies posit a connection between high rates of property tax
delinquency and other manifestations of urban blight, such as housing
abandonment and the growing problem of homelessness. 24 Because of
18. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
19. See 1986 Bureau of the Census Statistics, supra note 1, at 251 (Chart No. 429)
(state and local governments collected S96.5 billion in property taxes in 1984); The Nel-
son A. Rockefeller Institute of Gov't, State Univ. of New York, 1985-86 New York State
Statistical Yearbook 386 (Table M-44) (12th ed. 1986) [hereinafter New York State Sta-
tistical Yearbook] (New York state collected over S37 billion in real property taxes and
assessments in 1984).
20. See S. Olson & M. Lachman, supra note 2, at 1; Comment, supra note 13, at 404
& n.82.
21. See Rosewell v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 99 Il. 2d 407, 409, 459 N.E.2d 966,
967, appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1237 (1984); S. Olson & M. Lachman, supra note 2, at 1;
Comment, supra note 13, at 404 & n.82.
22. See Rosewell, 99 Ill. 2d at 409, 459 N.E.2d at 967 (121,000 parcels of tax-delin-
quent real estate in one year period in Chicago, Illinois); Appellant's Brief at 38, Alliance
Property Management and Dev., Inc. v. Andrews Ave. Equities, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 831, 517
N.E.2d 1327, 523 N.Y.S.2d 441, aft'g, 133 A.D.2d 30, 518 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't 1987)
("From 1982 to 1986 alone, 35,000 parcels in the City of New York were the subject of in
rem tax foreclosure actions.") (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review); S.
Olson & M. Lachman, supra note 2, at 1 (over 11,000 tax delinquent parcels in Cleveland
in 1974).
23. See S. Olson & M. Lachman, supra note 2, at 1; Comment, supra note 13, at 404
& n.82.
24. Tax delinquency often precedes residential abandonment. See J. Heilbrun, supra
note 1, at 355. It is symptomatic of the cycle of neglect in which urban landlords "milk"
borderline properties by collecting rent but not paying taxes or providing essential serv-
ices and ultimately abandoning the properties when they are of no further economic
value. See id. Such properties also are more likely to be targets of vandalism and arson.
See Langsdorf, Urban Decay, Property Tax Delinquency: A Solution in St. Louis, 5 Urb.
Law. 729, 736 (1973). As one author wrote, "[plroperty tax delinquency is not only the
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the importance of real estate taxes to the fiscal viability and overall
health of municipalities,25 procedures for collecting tax arrears must be
efficient and economical.2 6
In order to collect delinquent real estate taxes, states and municipali-
ties promulgate statutes providing for tax sales or in rem tax foreclo-
sures. 27 Although the names given these procedures and the methods
surest indicator of the degree to which the ecology of housing destruction has taken hold;
for the properties that manifest it, it is also unquestionably the preliminary stage to their
imminent disappearance from the housing stock." P. Salins, supra note 2, at 111. Inas-
much as the cycle of tax delinquency, abandonment and housing destruction reduces
available housing in the inner city, it can be tied to the growing problem of homelessness.
See Daley & Meislin, supra note 2, at Al, col. 1. Cities must be able to minimize housing
destruction by moving swiftly to take properties from tax delinquent, negligent landlords,
thereby salvaging precious housing stock. See id; see also M. Stegman, Housing and Va-
cancy Report: New York City, 1987, at 207 (1988) (suggesting that New York City's in
rem laws, by streamlining the tax foreclosure process, allow the city to "assume effective
control over marginal residential real estate before it is abandoned").
The problem of abandonment is a national one. See M. Stegman, The Dynamics of
Rental Housing in New York City 207 (1982) ("The General Accounting Office reported
in a 1978 study that 113 of the 149 responding cities had an abandonment problem.").
See generally Sternlieb & Burchell, Residential Property Tax Delinquency: A Forerunner
of Residential Abandonment, I Real Est. L.J. 256, 263 (1973) (analyzing the relationship
of tax delinquency to residential abandonment).
25. Property tax delinquency makes it more difficult for municipalities to provide
important services, such as police and fire protection, public education and street repairs.
See W. Va. Code § 1 IA-3-1 (1987); S. Olson & M. Lachman, supra note 2, at 1; Godfrey,
supra note 1, at 278. Property tax delinquency also increases the burden on those respon-
sible property owners who regularly pay their taxes. See W. Va. Code § I IA-3-1 (1987);
Godfrey, supra note 1, at 278.
26. See In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 226, 514 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393
(2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1987);
In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 641, 481 N.Y.S.2d
547, 551 (4th Dep't 1984) (Boomer, J., concurring); W. Va. Code § I IA-3-1 (1987); Note,
supra note 1, at 113-14 (1986).
27. See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 40-10-1 to -10-166 (1975 & Supp. 1987); Alaska Stat.
§ 29.45.320 (1986); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-312 (1980), § 42-381 (Supp. 1987); Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 26-37-101 (Supp. 1987); Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §§ 3361, 3391 (West 1987);
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-11-101 to -11-151 (1973 & Supp. 1987); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-157 (West Supp. 1988); Del. Code Ann. tit. 9, § 8701 (1975); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 197.180 (West 1971); Ga. Code Ann. § 48-4-1 (Supp. 1987); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 246-56
(1985); Idaho Code § 63-1126A (Supp. 1987); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, 719-733 (Smith-
Hurd 1970 & Supp. 1987); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 6-1.1-24-1 to -25-19 (Burns 1984 & Supp.
1986); Iowa Code Ann. § 446.7 (West Supp. 1988); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-2301 (1984);
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 134.430 (1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:2180 (Supp. 1988); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 1071 (West 1978); Md. Tax-Prop. Code Ann. § 14-808 (1986); Mass.
Ann. Laws. ch. 60, §§ 37, 53 (1971); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 211.60 (West 1986);
Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 280.01, 280.02 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); Miss. Code Ann. § 27-41-
55 (Supp. 1987); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 140.150 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Mont. Code Ann. § 15-
17-211 (1987); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1801 (1986); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 361.595 (Michic
1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 80.20 (1971); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 54:5-1 to :5-129 (West
1986); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-38-65 (1986); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 1000-1094,
§§ 1100-1174 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-369, 105-374, 105-
375 (1985 & Supp. 1987); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 57-24-01 to -24-31 (1983 & Supp. 1987);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 5721.18, 5721.19 (Anderson Supp. 1987); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
68, § 24311 (West Supp. 1988); Or. Rev. Stat. § 312.010 (1985); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72,
§ 5860.601 (Purdon 1968); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 44-9-1 to -9-46 (1980 & Supp. 1987); S.C.
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they employ vary from statute to statute,28 all accomplish the same pur-
pose: the property on which the taxes have not been paid is sold in order
to satisfy the tax arrears.' While the primary goal of these procedures is
to collect the back taxes,3° the threat of foreclosure also encourages the
Code Ann. §§ 12-51-40 to -51-170 (Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1987); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. §§ 10-23-1 to -23-29 (1982 & Supp. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-6001 to -6096
(1983); Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 34.01 to .08 (Vernon 1982 & Supp. 1988); Utah Code
Ann. § 59-2-1363 (1987); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5252 (1981); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-
3965 (Supp. 1988); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 84.64.010 to .64.460 (West 1962 & Supp.
1988); W. Va. Code §§ 1 1A-3-1 to -44 (1987); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 75.01 to .70 (West 1957
& Supp. 1987); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-3-101 to -109 (1987).
Municipalities may utilize the state tax sale or tax foreclosure statutes or adopt their
own provisions. See Blyth, Tax Titles, in Real Estate Titles 367, 369 (1984); Note, supra
note 1, at 113, 119; Note, The Constitutionality of Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Pro-
ceedings, 84 Yale L.J. 1505, 1505 n.1 (1975); see, e.g., N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 11.401 to -
428 (1986).
28. Compare e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1102(2) (McKinney 1972) (tax sale);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-9-7 (1980) (same); Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 34.01 (Vernon 1982)
(same); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5252 (1981) (same); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 74.39 (West 1957)
(same) with, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 54:5-104.29 to -104.75 (West 1986) (tax foreclosure);
N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 1120-1138 (McKinney 1972) (same).
In rem tax foreclosures offer municipalities a quicker, less expensive method of taking
over chronically tax delinquent property than traditional tax sales. See Godfrey, supra
note 1, at 271 n.1; Lebar, Sidewalks in the Woods- Evolution of In Rem Tax Foreclosure,
N.J. Law., Nov. 1981, at 14, 15. Both tax sales and in rem tax foreclosures are consid-
ered actions in rem. See Comment, supra note 13, at 393; Note, Due Process of Law and
Notice By Publication, 32 Ind. L.J. 469, 483 (1957).
In addition to their provisions for tax sales, both New York State and New York City
have provisions for in rem tax foreclosures. See N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 1120-1138
(McKinney 1972); N.Y.C. Admin. Code, §§ 11-401 to -428 (1986). As part of its policy
for dealing with its housing crisis, the City of New York retains the properties it seizes
through in rem foreclosures and acts as a landlord for an indefinite period of time. See
M. Stegman, Housing and Vacancy Report: New York City, 1987, at 207 (1988); Daley
& Meislin, supra note 2, at A1, col. 1.
In both traditional tax sales and in rem tax foreclosures, the owner may be given an
opportunity to redeem the property before the issuance of a deed to the tax sale purchaser
or state. See, e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1010 (McKinney 1972); R.I. Gen. Laws
§§ 44-9-19, 44-9-21 (1980); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); Tex.
Tax Code Ann. § 34.21 (Vernon 1982); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1345 (1987); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 32, § 5260 (1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 84.64.360 (West 1962).
29. See e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-19 (West 1986); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1000
(McKinney 1972); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3965 (1984).
30. See Almon v. Champion Int'l Corp., 349 So. 2d 15, 17 (Ala. 1977); Township of
Berkeley v. Berkeley Shore Water Co., 213 N.J. Super. 524, 532, 517 A.2d 1199, 1203
(App. Div. 1986); Tracy v. County of Chester, 507 Pa. 288, 297, 489 A.2d 1334, 1339(1985); W. Va. Code § 11 A-3-1 (1987). The West Virginia statute authorizing the sale of
land for tax delinquency, for example, emphasizes three purposes:
First, to provide for the speedy and expeditious enforcement of the tax claims
of the State and its subdivisions; second, to provide for the transfer of delin-
quent lands to those more responsible to, or better able to bear, the duties of
citizenship than were the former owners; and third, in furtherance of the policy
favoring the security of land titles, to establish an efficient procedure that will
quickly and finally dispose of all claims of the delinquent former owner and
secure to the new owner the full benefit of his purchase.
W. Va. Code § IlA-3-1 (1987).
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prompt payment of property taxes and discourages tax delinquency. 3'
Tax sales and in rem tax foreclosures necessarily result in the loss of
property rights32 and thus implicate the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.33 Since due process requires that parties be notified
and given an opportunity to be heard before the state deprives them of
their property, 34 statutes that authorize the sale of land for failure to pay
taxes provide for the notification of interested parties before the property
is sold. 35 They provide for one of two basic methods of giving notice:
31. See Almon, 349 So. 2d at 17; M. Stegman, Housing and Vacancy Report: New
York City, 1987, at 207 (1988); Godfrey, supra note 1, at 274; Comment, supra note 13,
at 402 n.70.
32. See Cooper v. Makela, 629 F. Supp. 658, 661 (W.D.N.Y. 1986). In Mennonite
Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), the Supreme Court found that a mort-
gagee's "property interest ... is significantly affected by a tax sale," id. at 798, because
"the tax sale may result in the complete nullification of the mortgagee's interest, since the
purchaser acquires title free of all liens and other encumbrances," id.
33. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 795; 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1070, at 423 (1987); Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 13, at 1091; see
also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
34. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); McCann v. Scaduto, 71 N.Y.2d
164, 172, 519 N.E.2d 309, 311, 524 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (1987); Rotunda, supra note 6,
§ 17.8, at 261-63.
35. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 40-10-4 (1985); Alaska Stat. § 29.45.330 (1986); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 42-387, 42-388 (1980 & Supp. 1987); Ark. Stat Ann. §§ 26-37-107, 26-37-
201, 26-37-301 (Supp. 1987); Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §§ 3363, 3365, 3702 (1987); Colo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 39-11-101, 39-11-102 (1973 & Supp. 1987); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 12-157
(West Supp. 1988); Del. Code Ann. tit. 9, §§ 8724, 8771-8772 (1975 & Supp. 1986); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 197.343 (West Supp. 1988); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 48-4-45, 48-4-46 (1982);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 246-56 (1985); Idaho Code § 63-I 126B (Supp. 1987); IlI. Ann. Stat. ch.
120, 722a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 6-1.1-24-4, 6-1.1-24-4.2 (Burns
1984 & Supp. 1986); Iowa Code Ann. § 446.9 (West Supp. 1988); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-
2303 (1984); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 134.440, 134.500 (1982 & Supp. 1986); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 47:2180 (Supp. 1988); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, §§ 1071, 1073 (1978); Md. Tax-
Prop. Code Ann. §§ 14-812, 14-813 (1986 & Supp. 1987); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 60, §§ 40,
42, 53 (Law. Co-op. 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 211.61a, 211.63, 211.64 (West
1986); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 297.07, 297.08 (West Supp. 1988); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 27-43-
3, 27-43-5 (1972 & Supp. 1987); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 140-170 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Mont.
Code Ann. § 15-17-122 (1987); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1804 (1986); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 361.565(6)(a)(1) (Michie 1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 80:21 (Supp. 1987); N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 54:5-26, 54:5-27, 54:5-104.42 (West 1986); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-38-66, 7-38-67
(1986); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1002(4) (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 105-369, 105-375(c) (1985 & Supp. 1987); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 57-24-01, 57-24-02, 57-
24-07 (1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 5721.18(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1987); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 68, § 24312 (West Supp. 1988); Or. Rev. Stat. § 312.040 (1985); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 72, § 5860.602 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 44-9-9, 44-9-10, 44-9-11
(1980 & Supp. 1987); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-49-220, 12-49-300, 12-51-140 (Law. Co-op.
1977 & Supp. 1987); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 10-23-2, 10-23-2.1, 10-23-2.2 (1982 &
Supp. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6012 (1983); Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.04 (Vernon
Supp. 1988); Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-1342, 59-2-1363 (1987); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32,
§ 5252 (1981); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3965 (Supp. 1988); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 84.64.030, 84.64.050, 84.64.080 (West 1962 & Supp. 1988); W. Va. Code § 1IA-3-2
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constructive notice by publication or posting36 or actual notice by per-
sonal service or mail.37 Notice by personal service or mail is expensive
and time-consuming,3" but more likely to reach parties with an interest in
(1987); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 75.521 (West 1957 & Supp. 1987); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-3-104
(1985).
These statutes may provide for different types of notice to owners as opposed to mort-
gagees or persons with other interests in real property. Compare, e.g., N.Y. Real Prop.
Tax Law § 1124 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988) (mailed notice to owner) with. e.g., N.Y.
Real Prop. Tax Law § 1126 (McKinney 1972) (mailed notice to mortgagee who previ-
ously filed statement with tax authority).
36. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-388 (1980); Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-3
(Burns 1984); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-104.42 (West 1986); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law
§ 1124; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 10-23-2 (Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1363
(1987); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3965 (1984); Wyo. Stat. § 39-3-104 (1985); N.Y.C. Admin.
Code § 11-406 (1986).
37. See, eg., Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-4 (Bums 1984) (notice by certified mail to
owner at last known address); Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-4.2 (Bums Supp. 1986) (notice
by certified mail to mortgagees and others with "substantial property interest of public
record"); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1002 (4) (McKinney Supp. 1987) (notice by first
class mail to owner); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-9-10 (Supp. 1987) (notice by registered or
certified mail to taxpayer who is resident of state); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-9-11 (1980) (no-
tice by registered or certified mail to mortgagees); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 10-23-2.1
(Supp. 1987) (notice by first class mail to owner); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1363 (1987)
(notice by certified mail to record owner and record lienholders); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32,
§ 5252(3)-(4) (1981) (notice by registered mail to delinquent taxpayer, mortgagee, or
lienholder). Some states permit personal service by handing a copy of the notice to the
addressee. See e.g., Ala. Code § 40-10-4 (1985); Ga. Code Ann. § 48-4-46(b) (1982); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:2180(B) (Supp. 1988); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 1073 (1978);
Miss. Code Ann. § 27-43-3 (Supp. 1987).
38. See, e.g., Homemakers Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Jones, No. 83-1856, slip op. at 4 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 4, 1984); Rosewell v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 99 111. 2d 407, 412, 459
N.E.2d 966, 968-69, appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1237 (1984); In re Tax Foreclosure No.
35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 226, 514 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d
694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1987); In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the
County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 641, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (4th Dep't 1984) (Boomer,
J., concurring). The expense of mailed notice goes beyond the cost of mailing it; it in-
cludes "hav[ing] someone check the records and ascertain with respect to each delinquent
taxpayer whether there is a mortgagee, perhaps whether the mortgage has been paid off,
and whether there is a dependable address." See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams,
462 U.S. 791, 806 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This generally will require the gov-
ernment to perform a title search. See Comment, supra note 13, at 403 n.81.
A number of courts have held that absent an express statutory requirement, a state
should not be required to undertake the expense of a title search. See Homemakers Fin.
Serv., slip op. at 4-5; Rosewell, 99 I11. 2d at 412-14, 459 N.E.2d at 968-69; Tax Foreclosure
No. 35, 127 A.D.2d at 226, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 393; Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County
of Erie, 103 A.D.2d at 641-42, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (Boomer, J., concurring). Some
statutes, however, do require that the state perform a title search. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 42-462(A) (Supp. 1987); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 246-56 (1985); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 27-43-5 (1972).
In the case of someone with an unrecorded interest in a tax delinquent property, such
as a tenant with a leasehold, a municipality would have to send an investigator to the
premises in order to inform her of a pending tax foreclosure. See W.S. 23 Realty Corp. v.
City of New York, 106 Misc. 2d 271, 273, 431 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (Sup. Ct. 1980). Some
have argued that mailed notice, in the long run, proves the more economical method
because many delinquent taxpayers will pay their arrears if they receive actual notice.
See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 n.5 (1983); Comment, supra
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real property. 39 Notice by publication or posting, while less expensive,"
is less likely to alert interested parties.41 For this reason the Supreme
Court has cast serious doubt on its constitutional sufficiency.42
In order to conform to the fourteenth amendment's mandate without
adopting the costly requirement of mailed notice to all parties, many
state and local governments have enacted statutes making mailed notice
of a tax sale or an in rem tax foreclosure contingent upon an interested
party's having filed a statement requesting it.43 Under these statutes,
mortgagees, other parties, and in the case of New York City, owners,
must apprise the local tax authority of their name, address, and interest
in the property in order to receive actual notice. 44 Those parties that
note 13, at 402 n.70. But see Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 806 n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority incorrectly took this factor into account).
39. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950).
40. See Comment, supra note 13, at 394.
41. The Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950) aptly stated the problems with publication as the sole form of notice:
Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in
small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home
outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that the infor-
mation will never reach him are large indeed.
Id. at 315. In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), the Supreme
Court applied the Mullane rationale to mortgagees in tax sales and stated that notice by
publication was not "means 'such as one desirous of actually informing the [mortgagee]
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.'" Id. at 799 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315
(alteration in original)).
42. See supra note 11; infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
43. Because most state statutes provide for unconditional mailed notice to property
owners, see, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-4 (Burns 1984); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law
§ 1002 (4) (McKinney Supp. 1987); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-9-10 (Supp. 1987); S.D. Codi-
fied Laws Ann. § 10-23-2.1 (Supp. 1987), most request notice provisions apply to mortga-
gees, lienors or anyone else holding other than a fee simple interest in the property, see,
e.g., Alaska Stat. § 29.45.350 (1986); Idaho Code § 63-1 126B(4) (Supp. 1987); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 60, § 38 (Law. Coop. 1978); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-104.48 (West 1986);
N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1126 (McKinney 1972); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 11-417
(1986). But see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-104.48 (West 1986) (owners and mortgagees must
file notice stating name and address to be served with notice of foreclosure); N.Y.C. Ad-
min. Code § 11-416 (1986) (owners must file owners' registration cards to receive notice).
See generally Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 13, at 1098-1100 (discussing constitu-
tionality of request notice provisions); Comment, supra note 13, at 407-11 (same).
44. See Alaska Stat. § 29.45.350 (1986) (holder of mortgage can request that copy of
foreclosure list be sent by certified mail); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 197.344 (West Supp. 1988)
(mortgagee can request notice of tax delinquency); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 246-57 (1985) (no-
tice by mail to mortgagees who have registered mortgages with registrar of land court);
Idaho Code § 63-1126B(4)(c) (Supp. 1987) (notice by certified mail to a party in interest
if she has previously filed a written request for a copy of notice); Iowa Code Ann. § 446.9
(West Supp. 1988) (notice to mortgagees and others with an interest in real property who
have requested notice); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:2180.1 (West Supp. 1988) (notice by
mail to mortgagees who notify tax collectors of their interest); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 60,
§ 38 (Law. Co-op. 1978) (If mortgagee gives notice to tax collector, "demand for pay-
ment shall be made on the mortgagee instead of the mortgagor."); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 361.565(6)(a)(3) (Michie 1986) (notice by mail to holders of recorded security interests
who have requested notice); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-104.48 (West 1986) (notice of foreclo-
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request notice will receive mailed notice of either the fact of delin-
quency,45 the impending tax sale or foreclosure itself,46 or the expiration
of a period during which the property may be redeemed,4" depending on
the specific statute. To evaluate the constitutionality of these notice pro-
visions, it is necessary to examine the Supreme Court's evolving due pro-
cess jurisprudence.
II. DUE PROCESS AND NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
IN IN REM PROCEEDINGS
Traditionally, the due process notice requirement was less stringent for
in rem proceedings, including tax sales, than for actions in personam.4 8
sure to be served on owners, mortgagees and other parties who have filed notice with tax
district); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1126 (McKinney 1972) (notice to mortgagees and
other parties in interest who file notice with enforcing officer); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-
375(c) (Supp. 1987) (notice to lienholders who have filed requests for notice); S.C. Code
Ann. § 12-49-240 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (For mortgagee to be entitled to notice of levy, she
should fie a list with all mortgages as to which notice is desired annually.); S.D. Codified
Laws Ann. § 10-23-2.2 (Supp. 1987) (if person in possession, person in whose name prop-
erty is taxed, mortgagee or her assignee or any other person who has an interest in real
estate annually has requested notice of sale of real property and paid a $3.00 mailing fee,
county treasurer will send notice by certified mail); see also N.Y.C. Admin. Code § I 1-
416 (1986) (Commissioner of Finance to mail notice of foreclosure to owners who have
filed owner's registration cards); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 11-417 (1986) (Commissioner of
Finance to mail notice to mortgagees and others who have filed "in rem card" requesting
it); cf. Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3926 (1984) (mortgagees and other interested parties can
request statement indicating whether or not property taxes have been paid).
45. See, eg., Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3926 (1984).
46. See eg., N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1126 (McKinney 1972); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 10-23-2.1 (Supp. 1987); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 11-417 (1986).
47. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 10-26-5.1 (Supp. 1987).
48. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877). Actions in personam are proceedings in
which "the object... is a person." Fraser, Actions in Rem, 34 Cornell L.Q. 29, 29 (1948);
see Note, Property-Meeting the Due Process Requirements of Notice to Mortgagees in Tax
Sales, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 437, 438 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Property]. An action
in rem involves the determination of rights with respect to property within the court's
jurisdiction. See Fraser, supra, at 29; 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 33, § 1070, at
422. Unlike in personam jurisdiction, "in rem jurisdiction operates directly on the prop-
erty and the court's judgment is effective against all persons who have an interest in the
property." Id. For a more comprehensive discussion of actions in rem, see Fraser, supro,
at 29-33.
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court, in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877),
articulated the traditional distinction in notice requirements between actions in rem and
actions in personam. Id. at 726-27. The Court wrote that notice by publication
may answer in all actions which are substantially proceedings in rem. But
where the entire object of the action is to determine the personal rights and
obligations of the defendants, that is, where the suit is merely in personam, con-
structive service in this form upon a non-resident is ineffectual for any purpose.
Id. at 727. The Supreme Court later eliminated this distinction in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950). For further discussion of the
historical distinction between actions in rem and actions in personan with respect to
notice requirements, see 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 33, § 1070, at 416425;
Note, supra note 28, at 471-72; Note, Due Process in Tax Sales in New York" The Insuffi-
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Thus, while publication long was held to provide adequate notice in ac-
tions in rem,49 actions in personam required personal service.50 Courts
justified this distinction on several grounds. First, in actions in per-
sonam, notice literally was necessary to acquire jurisdiction over the par-
ties.5 ' Because the state was deemed already to have jurisdiction over all
property within its borders,5 2 notice in actions in rem merely served to
inform parties that the res was subject to a proceeding." Historically,
courts also embraced the "caretaker theory"-the notion that nonresi-
dent property owners had local caretakers to guard their land and ap-
prise them of any published notices affecting their property.54 Further,
the law generally charged landowners with the responsibility of keeping
informed about the condition of their land." Courts deemed each of
these grounds to mitigate the need to give personal notice to the land-
owner of impending in rem actions.
Notice requirements for tax sale proceedings were even less stringent
than for other actions in rem.56 The state's strong interest in collecting
taxes justified this relaxed standard.57 In addition, property owners were
presumed to know the laws affecting their property, 58 including the re-
quirement that they pay property taxes, with the attendant risk that fail-
ure to do so would result in a tax sale or foreclosure.59
The Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence has evolved consider-
ably since the days of Pennoyer v. Neff." In the area of personal jurisdic-
ciency of Notice By Publication, 25 Syracuse L. Rev. 769, 770-75 (1974) [hereinafter Note,
Tax Sales in New York]; Casenote, supra note 1, at 1469; Note, supra note 27, at 1506-08.
49. See Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 262 (1907); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 92
(1904); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877).
50. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 726-27; McCann v. Scaduto, 71 N.Y.2d 164, 173, 519
N.E.2d 309, 312, 524 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (1987); Note, supra note 28, at 470.
51. See Note, supra, note 28, at 470.
52. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722; Fraser, supra note 48, at 29; Note, Requirements of
Notice, supra note 13, at 1260.
53. See Note, Requirements of Notice, supra note 13, at 1260; Note, supra note 28, at
471.
54. See Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 262 (1907); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. and
Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559, 564 (1889); McCann v. Scaduto, 71 N.Y.2d 164, 174-75,
519 N.E.2d 309, 312-13, 524 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401-02 (1987).
55. See Ballard, 204 U.S. at 262; McCann, 71 N.Y.2d at 173, 519 N.E.2d at 312, 524
N.Y.S.2d at 401.
56. See Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 89 (1904).
57. See Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 417 (1908); Ballard, 204 U.S. at 256-57;
Leigh, 193 U.S. at 89-90; McCann, 71 N.Y.2d at 174, 519 N.E.2d at 312, 524 N.Y.S.2d at
401; Note, Tax Sales in New York, supra note 48, at 771; Note, supra note 27, at 1507
n.13.
58. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 & n.25 (1982); Ballard, 204 U.S. at
254-55; Sheehan v. County of Suffolk, 67 N.Y.2d 52, 59, 490 N.E.2d 523, 525, 499
N.Y.S.2d 656, 658, cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1006 (1986); cf. Note, Tax Sales in New York,
supra note 48, at 771 (property owners have duty to familiarize themselves with laws
affecting their property); Note, supra note 27, at 1507 (same).
59. See Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 418 (1908); Note, supra note 27, at 1511-
12.
60. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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tion, the Court's analysis has developed from the rigid and artificial
concepts of territoriality and state sovereignty ennunciated in Pennoyer6"
to the" 'highly realistic' " balancing test exemplified by the Court's opin-
ion in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.62 Similarly, the Court's examina-
tion of notice requirements for in rem actions has expanded from
acceptance of the legal fiction of "constructive notice" by publication63 to
the requirement that notice be reasonably geared to reach interested par-
ties.' 4 Thus, the Court has stated that "[n]otice by mail or other means
as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondi-
tion to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property
interests of any party."65 The Supreme Court first enunciated its modern
approach to notice for in rem proceedings in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.66
A. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,67 the Supreme
Court eliminated the traditional distinction between the notice required
for actions in rem and actions in personam.68 It held that notice in all
actions must be reasonably calculated to reach those parties whose names
and addresses are known,69 and that constructive notice by publication is
not sufficient for such parties.70 While this test does not appear to be
difficult to meet, it represents a much stricter notice requirement than
previously had applied to actions in rem.71
61. See id. at 722 ("[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory.... [Consequently] the laws of one State have
no operation outside of its territory. .. ").
62. 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) ("Once it has been decided that a defendant purpose-
fully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be consid-
ered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.' "). For a general discussion of the
historical development ofjurisdiction, see 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 33, § 1070.
63. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877); McCann v. Scaduto, 71 N.Y.2d
164, 173-74, 519 N.E.2d 309, 312-13, 524 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401-02 (1987); see also supra
note 36 and accompanying text (discussing constructive notice); supra notes 51-59 and
accompanying text (discussing various justifications advanced for acceptance of construc-
tive notice in actions in rem).
64. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950);
Note, Requirements of Notice, supra note 13, at 1257-60; Note, supra note 27, at 1507-08.
65. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (emphasis
omitted).
66. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See Casenote, supra note 1, at 1470; cf. Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 206, 212 (1977) (modem analysis of basis ofjurisdiction analagous to Mul-
lane's analysis of notice).
67. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
68. See id. at 312-13; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 206.
69. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 317-18.
70. See id. at 318.
71. See Casenote, supra note 1, at 1470; Note, supra note 28, at 472. Mullane in-
volved the establishment of a common trust fund under the banking laws of New York
State. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 308. The relevant statute provided for notice to trust
beneficiaries of a binding settlement of accounts by publication in a local newspaper. See
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The Mullane Court set forth the principle that "[a]n elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circum-
stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections."72 To determine
whether the method of notice was "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances," the Court applied a balancing test. 3 It began by exam-
ining the state's strong interest in settling common trust funds, and
stated that a "construction of the Due Process Clause which would place
impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified."74
Against the state's interest, it then balanced the individual's interest in
receiving notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to an action affect-
ing her property.75 The Court employed a functional test, emphasizing
that it had "not committed itself to any formula achieving a balance be-
tween these interests in a particular proceeding or determining when con-
structive notice may be utilized or what test it must meet." 76
Thus, while Mullane did impose a stricter notice requirement than
previously had applied to in rem proceedings, it did not reject completely
notice by publication77 or lay down any rigid rule as to what method of
notice was required in a particular situation. 7 Instead, the Court em-
phasized flexibility and reasonableness under the totality of particular
circumstances.79 More than thirty years later, in Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams,8" the Court applied the principles of Mullane to a
mortgagee in a tax sale proceeding, holding that where a mortgagee's
id. at 309-10. The Court rejected publication as the sole means of notifying such known
beneficiaries, stating that while publication was constitutionally sufficient for unknown
beneficiaries, it was inadequate as to known beneficiaries, "not because in fact it fails to
reach everyone, but because under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to
reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand." Id. at 319. Thus,
Mullane has sometimes been read to stand for the proposition that "the means most likely
to give actual notice of the proceeding is the minimum standard required by the four-
teenth amendment." Note, supra note 28, at 473 (emphasis in original).
72. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 313-14.
75. See id. at 314.
Put otherwise, the Mullane test compares the minimal expense of providing notice to
known parties with the substantial cost of not receiving notice of a proceeding that affects
one's property rights. See id. at 313-14.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 317; Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 804 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Note, Tax Sales in New York, supra note 48, at 773. In a
recent case involving notice to creditors of an estate, the Supreme Court reiterated that
for parties "who are not 'reasonably ascertainable,' publication notice can suffice." Tulsa
Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1347 (1988).
78. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15. The Court stated that "notice must be of such
nature as reasonably to convey the required information .... But if with due regard for
the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the
constitutional requirements are satisfied." Id.
79. See id.; Note, Tax Sales in New York, supra note 48, at 773-74.
80. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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identity and location are reasonably ascertainable, publication and post-
ing does not provide constitutionally sufficient notice."s
B. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,82 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of an Indiana statute that provided for mailed notice of
a pending tax sale to property owners, but only constructive notice by
publication to others, including mortgagees. 3 After the property owner
in the case failed to pay her real estate taxes, the county commenced tax
sale proceedings and, pursuant to the statute, published and posted no-
tice and mailed notice to the owner by certified mail." The county, how-
ever, did not mail notice to the mortgagee of the property, and the
mortgagee never received actual notice of the proceeding. 5 After the
property was sold at a tax sale, the mortgagee argued that it had not
received constitutionally sufficient notice of the proceedings.86 The
Supreme Court held that the Indiana statute violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 7
The Mennonite Court began its analysis by stating that Mullane con-
trolled the case,88 but instead of balancing the interests of both the state
and the individual as it had in Mullane, it looked solely at the interest of
the mortgagee.89 The Court stated that "[s]ince a mortgagee clearly has
a legally protected property interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably
calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale,"'  and continued that
"[w]hen the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly re-
corded, constructive notice by publication must be supplemented by no-
tice mailed to the mortgagee's last known available address, or by
81. See id. at 798, 800.
82. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
83. See id. at 793.
84. See id. at 794.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 795.
87. See id. at 800.
88. See id. at 798. Although the Mennonite Court claimed to follow Mullane, see id.
at 798-99, some controversy exists over whether it really did so. For the proposition that
Mennonite follows from Mullane, see id.; McCann v. Scaduto, 71 N.Y.2d 164, 175-76,
519 N.E.2d 309, 313, 524 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402-03 (1987); In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by
the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 639, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (4th Dep't 1984); Note,
Due Process Notice Required For Real Estate Tax Sales, 49 Mo. L Rev. 385, 387-88
(1984). For the proposition that Mennonite departs from the Mullane standard, see Men-
nonite, 462 U.S. at 801-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Comment, Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams: Expansion of the Due Process Notice Requirements, 46 La. L Rev.
311, 316 (1985). For the proposition that Mennonite extends, but does not necessarily
reject, Mullane, see Bender v. City of Rochester, 765 F.2d 7, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1985)
("though the standard may have become slightly more rigorous, the basic flexibility of the
Mullane standard has not been discarded.").
89. Compare Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983) with
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).
90. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798.
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personal service." 9 '
Justice O'Connor, in a strong dissent, declared that the majority opin-
ion represented a marked departure from Supreme Court precedent. 92
She stated that had the Court "observed its prior decisions and engaged
in the balancing required by Mullane, it would have reached the opposite
result."93 In contrast to the majority, Justice O'Connor performed a full-
scale balancing test, emphasizing the state's "vital interest in the collec-
tion of its tax revenues in whatever reasonable manner that it chooses."194
She went on to stress that the mortgagee reasonably might have taken
steps to protect its interest in the property, 95 noting that "[w]hen a party
is unreasonable in failing to protect its interest despite its ability to do so,
due process does not require that the State save the party from its own
lack of care." 96 She concluded that "[t]he balance required by Mullane
clearly weighs in favor of finding that the Indiana statutes satisfied the
requirements of due process. '
The Mennonite decision left open a number of questions. First, inas-
much as Mennonite specifically addressed the issue of notice to mortga-
gees,98 courts and commentators have differed as to the extent to which
91. Id.
92. Justice O'Connor wrote:
Today, the Court departs significantly from its prior decisions and holds that
before the State conducts any proceeding that will affect the legally protected
property interests of any party, the State must provide notice to that party by
means certain to ensure actual notice as long as the party's identity and location
are "reasonably ascertainable." Applying this novel and unjustified principle to
the present case, the Court decides that the mortgagee involved deserved more
than the notice by publication and posting that were provided.
Id. at 800-01 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see Note, Constitutional Law,
supra note 13, at 1095; Note, supra note 1, at 122 n.40. For a discussion of Justice
O'Connor's influence on the Supreme Court, including her dissent in Mennonite, see
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L.
Rev. 543, 604-05, 607 (1986).
93. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 805-06 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 806.
95. See id. at 806-07. Justice O'Connor suggested that the mortgagee, in addition to
checking the local newspaper for advertisements concerning the sale of the property
could have insisted that the mortgagor "provide it with copies of paid tax assessments, or
could have required that [the mortgagor] deposit the tax moneys in an escrow account, or
could have itself checked the public records to determine whether the tax assessment had
been paid." Id. at 808-09.
96. Id. at 809.
97. Id.
Given the relatively insignificant cost to the state of mailing notice, Justice O'Connor's
full-scale balancing test should not lead to a different result than that reached by the
majority. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
However, Justice O'Connor, in asking what the mortgagee might reasonably have done
to ensure that it received notice, see Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 808-09 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing), adds another element to the balancing test. In doing so, she follows the Mullane
Court's suggestion that the constitutionality of notice be determined "with due regard for
the practicalities and peculiarities of the case." See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
98. See id. at 792.
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its result applies to parties with other interests in real property.99 Thus,
the sufficiency of published notice to property owners on the one hand,
and those with lesser interests, such as easements and mechanics' liens,
on the other, remains in doubt."° Second, courts have grappled with the
Mennonite Court's message that, while the state must notify by mail
those parties who are reasonably ascertainable,10 1 the state need not "un-
dertake extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and whereabouts of
a mortgagee."10 2 This has resulted in uncertainty concerning the precise
lengths to which a state or municipality must go in order to locate and
identify an interested party.0 3 Finally, in a footnote, the Supreme Court
99. See McCann v. Scaduto, 71 N.Y.2d 164, 176, 519 N.E.2d 309, 314, 524 N.Y.S.2d
398, 403 (1987) (Mennonite implicitly applies to owners as well as mortgagees); Note,
supra note 88, at 387 (questions raised by Mennonite include "whether notice to owners,
where not already required by statute, is now necessary" and "what notice to other inter-
ested parties is required"); Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 13, at 1100-01 (discuss-
ing distinction between owners and mortgagees, stating that the Court "has not yet
squarely faced the question whether notice by publication in tax sales meets the due pro-
cess test for property owners" as opposed to mortgagees).
100. See Note, supra note 88, at 394-98 (questioning applicability of Mennonite to deed
of trust beneficiaries and trustees, possessors of mineral interests and leasehold interests,
remaindermen, owners of easements, judgment lienors); Note, Property, supra note 48, at
446 n.108 ("Other situations in which a person other than the owner may be entitled to
notice include persons with an easement of record, persons with a leasehold interest in the
property, probate proceedings, divorce proceedings, and custody/adoption proceed-
ings."). Courts, however, have applied the Mennonite standard to other property inter-
ests. See Wittemyer v. Cole, 689 P.2d 720, 721-22 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (owner of an
easement entitled to notice of tax sale); Wylie v. Patton, 111 Idaho 61, 65, 720 P.2d 649,
653 (Ct. App. 1986) (applying Mennonite to a deed of trust beneficiary). But see also
Note, supra note 88, at 396 (owner of easement not affected by tax sale and hence does
not require actual notice).
101. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800.
102. Id. at 798 n.4.
103. Justice O'Connor expressed a concern that,
[u]nder the Court's decision today, it is not clear how far the State must go in
providing for reasonable efforts to ascertain the name and address of an affected
party.... This uncertainty becomes particularly ominous in the light of the
fact that the duty to ascertain identity and location, and to notify by mail or
other similar means, exists whenever any legally protected interest is
implicated.
Id. at 805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For cases after Mennonite addressing the question
how far the state must go to find and notify an interested party, see Bender v. City of
Rochester, 765 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1985) (task of examining Surrogate's Court records
beyond that involved in Mennonite); Rosewell v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 99 Ill. 2d
407, 413, 459 N.E.2d 966, 969 (referring to the "chaotic situation" that the task of per-
forming 121,000 title searches would produce), appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1237 (1984);
Township of Brick v. Block 48-7, Lots 34, 35, 36, 202 N.J. Super. 246, 249, 494 A.2d 829,
832 (1985) (examination by local tax authorites of outdated tax rolls, and communication
with property owners to determine whether addresses remain correct are tasks beyond
the dictates of due process), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 2181 (1987).
In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the requirement that those inter-
ested parties who are "known or reasonably ascertainable" receive actual notice. See
Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1348 (1988). The case
involved a hospital, the creditor of an estate, which had not received actual notice of the
commencement of probate proceedings. Under the relevant Oklahoma statute, the execu-
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specifically left open the question whether request notice provisions sat-
isfy the due process requirement of notice in tax sale proceedings. °4 The
lower courts that have addressed this issue since Mennonite have reached
conflicting results. 105
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REQUEST NOTICE PROVISIONS
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Mennonite, a number of courts
have examined request notice provisions analogous to the one referred to
in the opinion's footnote. Some courts, claiming to follow the reasoning
of the Mennonite majority, maintain that a state cannot transfer its con-
stitutional obligation to property owners or mortgagees by requiring
them to request notice.'0 6 These courts rely heavily on the Mennonite
dictum that "a party's ability to take steps to safeguard its interests does
not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation."' 7 Others apply the
Mullane balancing test as elaborated on by Justice O'Connor in her Men-
nonite dissent,'08 the outcome of which allows the state to place the bur-
den on the property owner or mortgagee to request notice.' 0 9 These
trix was required to publish notice, but did not have to mail notice to creditors. See id. at
1342. The Court held that where a creditor is "known or 'reasonably ascertainable,'...
the Due Process Clause requires that [it] be given '[n]otice by mail or other means as
certain to ensure actual notice.'" Id. at 1348 (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v.
Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983)). However, it remanded the case to determine whether,
under the circumstances, the creditor's identity was "known or reasonably ascertainable"
by the executrix. See id. Significantly, it noted that, although the executrix was aware of
her husband's lengthy stay at the hospital, "it is not clear that this awareness translates
into a knowledge of appellant's claim." Id.
104. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 793 n.2. In 1980, after the events which were the
subject of the Mennonite case, but before the decision issued, Indiana amended its code to
include a request notice provision. See Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-4.2 (Bums 1984). The
Mennonite Court stated that "[b]ecause the events in question in this case occurred before
the 1980 amendment, the constitutionality of the amendment is not before us." 462 U.S.
at 793 n.2. Indiana subsequently amended its code again, and it now provides for uncon-
ditional mailed notice to mortgagees as well as owners. See Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-
4.2 (Burns Supp. 1986).
105. Compare, e.g., In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 226-27, 514
N.Y.S.2d 390, 393-94 (2d Dep't) (holding request notice provision constitutional), appeal
dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1987) with, e.g., In re
Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 640, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547,
550 (4th Dep't 1984) (holding request notice provision unconstitutional).
106. See Wylie v. Patton, 111 Idaho 61, 64-65, 720 P.2d 649, 652-53 (Ct. App. 1986);
Town of Phillipsburg v. Block 22 Lots 14, 15, 16, 218 N.J. Super. 558, 564, 528 A.2d 98,
100 (1987); Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d at 639-40, 481
N.Y.S.2d at 550; Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Umatilla County, 77 Or. App. 283, 289-90,
713 P.2d 33, 36 (1986) (en banc).
107. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983). See Town of
Phillipsburg, 218 N.J. Super. at 564, 528 A.2d at 100; Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the
County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d at 639, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 550; Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 77 Or.
App. at 288-89, 713 P,2d at 35-36.
108. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Mullane balancing test);
notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent).
109. See, e.g., Homemakers Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Jones, No. 83-1856, slip op. at 4 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 4, 1984); In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 227, 514 N.Y.S.2d
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decisions properly focus on the strength of the state's interest in efficient
and economical notice procedures, 110 as well as the reasonableness of re-
quiring the property owner or mortgagee to take a minimal step to pro-
tect her interest.III Under this test, and the guidance offered by
Mennonite, request notice provisions are constitutional.
Request notice statutes are functionally dissimilar from the type of
statute addressed in Mennonite."2 The constitutionality of request no-
tice provisions can best be analyzed by direct reference to the Mullane
test, which formed the basis of the Mennonite opinion.' 13 Under Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.," 4 courts must "balance the
individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment""' 5 against the state's interest in efficiently collecting its taxes. I 6
Mullane also stresses that the determination whether notice in a given
proceeding satisfies due process must be made "under all the
circumstances." 1 17
390, 394 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518 N.Y.S.2d
1030 (1987); In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 641,
481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (4th Dep't 1984) (Boomer, J., concurring); cf. Save Our Dunes v.
Alabama Dep't of Env. Management, 834 F.2d 984, 989-90 (11th Cir. 1987) (state can
require interested parties to request notice of proceedings affecting property); Mid-State
Homes, Inc. v. Portis, 652 F. Supp. 640, 645 OV.D. La. 1987) (finding it reasonable for
state to require interested parties to request notice of seizure and sale of property).
110. See Homemakers Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Jones, No. 83-1856, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 4, 1984); In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 226, 514 N.Y.S.2d 390,
393 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1030
(1987); In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 641, 481
N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (4th Dep't 1984) (Boomer, J., concurring).
111. See Homemakers, slip. op. at 4-5; Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d at 226, 514
N.Y.S.2d at 393-94; Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d at 642,
481 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (Boomer, J., concurring).
112. The statute at issue in Mennonite made no provision for notice to mortgagees
other than by publication. See id. at 793. In contrast, request notice provisions provide
actual notice to those mortgagees who take the minimal step of requesting notice. See
supra note 111. In Mennonite, the Court emphasized that it was unreasonable to expect
an interested party to "keep abreast of" published or posted notices, on the one hand, or
constantly inquire into the tax delinquent status of a piece of property on the other. See
Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 799. The requirement of filing a request for notice, however, is a
simple act, which, once accomplished, guarantees mailed notice of a tax sale. See Home-
makers Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Jones, No. 83-1856, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 4, 1984); In re
Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 226-27, 514 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (2d Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1987).
113. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798. There is some controversy as to whether the
Mennonite decision follows from Mullane. See supra note 88.
114. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
115. Id. at 314.
116. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 806 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
Under the balancing test and totality of the circumstances approach established by
Mullane, request notice provisions satisfy the requirements of due process. As Justice
O'Connor stated in her Mennonite dissent, "[i]f the members of a particular class gener-
ally possess the ability to safeguard their interests, then this fact must be taken into ac-
count when we consider the 'totality of circumstances,'" 462 U.S. at 803, and that
"[w]hen a party is unreasonable in failing to protect its interest despite its ability to do so,
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The state's need for efficient and economical collection of property
taxes is manifest." 8 Property tax delinquency represents a critical prob-
lem that may contribute to a variety of other symptoms of urban
blight." 9 Tax delinquency often precedes housing abandonment, 20 and
to help prevent the housing decay and destruction that results from aban-
donment,' 2 cities need procedures that allow them to take possession of
tax delinquent properties as quickly as possible. 122 Moreover, the greater
the threat of a quick foreclosure, the more likely it is that owners will not
allow their properties to fall into tax arrears.123 As a general fiscal mat-
ter, the state has an interest in having the most economical and least
time-consuming tax collection methods possible.
The Supreme Court acknowledged early in this century that the state
had considerable leeway in the area of collection of delinquent taxes, 124
resulting in diminished protection for landowners,125 and that less notice
would suffice in this area than in others. 126 Thus, courts traditionally
have deferred to state and municipal tax authorities in the area of prop-
erty tax collection procedures. 127 They have acknowledged that a state's
interest in the efficient and inexpensive collection of delinquent taxes may
be more compelling today than ever before. 28 As Justice O'Connor
due process does not require that the State save the party from its own lack of care," id.
at 809; cf. Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 651 n.5 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[I]n
making the initial determination of what notice is reasonable, the likelihood that a party
will learn of the proceedings without notice from the state and his ability to protect him-
self are relevant circumstances.").
118. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 24.
120. See J. Heilbrun, supra note 1, at 355; P. Salins, supra note 2, at 11I; supra note 24.
121. See P. Salins, supra note 2, at 111; supra note 24.
122. See Daley & Meislin, supra note 2, at AI, col. I (suggesting that New York City's
problematic role as landlord of the buildings that it has taken in in rem tax foreclosures
stems in part from the fact that by the time the city seized the buildings they were run
down.); see also supra note 24 (discussing problems stemming from tax delinquency).
123. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
124. See Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 417 (1908); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79,
89 (1904); Note, supra note 27, at 1507 n.13.
125. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 806-07 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 417 (1908); Ballard v.
Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 254 (1907); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 89 (1904); Note, supra
note 27, at 1507.
126. See Ballard, 204 U.S. at 262.
127. See Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 417 (1908); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79,
89 (1904); Note, supra note 27, at 1507 n.13. As Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent in
Mennonite, "[fthe Court neglects the fact that the State is a better judge of how it wants
to settle its tax debts than is this Court." Mennonite, 462 U.S. 799, 806 n.4 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
128. See Rosewell v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 99 Ill. 2d 407, 416, 459 N.E.2d 966,
970, appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1237 (1984); Alliance Property Management and Dcv.,
Inc. v. Andrews Ave. Equities, Inc., 133 A.D.2d 30, 33, 518 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (1st
Dep't) (Sandier, J., dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 70 N.Y.2d 831, 517 N.E.2d 1327,
523 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1987); In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 226, 514
N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518
N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1987).
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stated in her dissent in Mennonite, the state has a "vital interest in the
collection of its tax revenues in whatever reasonable manner that it
chooses." 129 In view of this important state interest, requiring the state
to identify, locate, and notify all parties with an interest in a tax delin-
quent property is unreasonable, especially when compared to the mini-
mal inconvenience to such parties of requesting notice. 3
Requiring the state to locate and identify all interested parties is not
only burdensome but also wasteful. Such a rule could force states to
perform title searches13 1 or resort to even more costly measures.' 32
Moreover, requiring actual notice is unnecessary for most interested par-
ties. The vast majority of mortgagees in this country are institutional
lenders1 33 who routinely pay the property taxes for their mortgagors'
and therefore have firsthand knowledge whether the taxes are delin-
quent. 135 These and even most noncommercial mortgagees are likely to
129. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 806 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
130. Cf. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985) (where an important state
interest is served, government can condition retention of existing property rights on an
interested party's taking a reasonable step to protect her interest).
131. See, e.g., Homemakers Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Jones, No. 83-1856, slip op. at 4 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 4, 1984); Rosewell v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 99 Ill. 2d 407, 413, 459
N.E.2d 966, 969, appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1237 (1984); Alliance Property Management
and Dev., Inc. v. Andrews Ave. Equities, Inc., 133 A.D.2d 30, 33, 518 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807
(1st Dep't) (SandIer, J., dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 70 N.Y.2d 831, 517 N.E.2d
1327, 523 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1987); In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 226, 514
N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518
N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1987); In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d
636, 641, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (4th Dep't 1984) (Boomer, J., concurring). But see
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Umatilla County, 77 Or. App. 283, 291, 713 P.2d 33, 37
(1986) (not necessary to perform a title search "to discover.., who may have a recorded
interest in a parcel of real property").
132. For instance, the addresses on recorded instruments are notoriously inaccurate,
see Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 806 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting), and the state must go beyond the record to locate the party, see id. In the case
of tenants and others whose interests are unrecorded, the state must investigate even
further. See W.S. 23 Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 106 Misc. 2d 271, 273, 431
N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ("Plaintiff's lease is not a matter of public record, and
the only way the city collector could find out about it would be a visit to the premises.").
See generally supra note 38 (discussing expense involved in alternative methods of
notice).
133. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 808 (O'Connor, I., dissenting) ("[A]pproximately
95% of the mortgage debt outstanding in the United States is held by private institutional
lenders and federally supported agencies."); 1986 Bureau of the Census Statistics, supra
note 1, at 489 (Chart No. 822) (majority of outstanding mortgage debt in 1985 held by
banks, life insurance companies, federal agencies, and other institutional lenders).
134. See Homemakers Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Jones, No. 83-1856, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 4, 1984). In Mennonite, Justice O'Connor stated that "[ijt is highly unlikely, if
likely at all, that a significant number of mortgagees are unaware of the consequences
that ensue when their mortgagors fail to pay taxes assessed on the mortgaged property."
462 U.S. at 808.
135. See Homemakers, slip op. at 4 (majority of commercial lenders pay real property
taxes for their mortgagors, collecting the taxes along with the monthly mortgage
payment).
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possess the minimal sophistication required to file requests for notice in
advance of a tax sale.136 Therefore, unconditional mailed notice to these
mortgagees would be expensive, time-consuming, and unnecessary.
While this argument is convincing where sophisticated creditors are
concerned, some assert that it is unreasonable to require a layperson to
acquaint herself with such an obscure statutory requirement as a request
notice provision. 137 The filing of a request notice form, however, is only
one of several statutorily required acts associated with any real estate
transaction. 138 Others include recording a deed or mortgage 139 and pay-
ing recording, transfer, mortgage, or capital gains tax.""4 Failure to exe-
cute properly any one of these acts may result in the complete loss of the
property interest.'41 Thus, it is not unreasonable to require those who
purchase an interest in real property or who lend money secured by real
property to acquaint themselves with request notice provisions or to con-
sult with qualified counsel or an experienced realtor before entering into
real estate transactions. 4 2 Most people who obtain a security or other
136. See Alliance Property Management and Dev., Inc. v. Andrews Ave. Equities,
Inc., 133 A.D.2d 30, 33, 518 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (Ist Dep't) (Sandler, J., dissenting), aff'd
on other grounds, 70 N.Y.2d 831, 517 N.E.2d 1327, 523 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1987); In re Fore-
closure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 642, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551
(4th Dep't 1984) (Boomer, J., concurring); Brief for Respondent at 44, In re Tax Foreclo-
sure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 514 N.Y.S.2d 390 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d
694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1987) (available in the files of the Fordham
Law Review).
137. See In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 641,
481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550. The court was concerned that the problem of mortgagees who
lose their property interests because they do not receive notice of tax sales, "would only
be exacerbated by the recent trend in which many noninstitutional lenders, particularly
private persons who engaged in seller financing, finance real estate transactions." Id. at
640, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 550. See also Comment, supra note 13, at 409 (most laypersons are
ignorant of existence of request notice provisions and it would be unreasonable to require
that they familiarize themselves).
138. See Brief for Respondent at 44, In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220,
514 N.Y.S.2d 390 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518
N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1987) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review).
139. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 32-1-2-11 (Burns Supp. 1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:22-
I (West 1940); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
140. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 5402 (1974) (realty transfer tax); N.Y. Tax
Law §§ 220-245 (McKinney 1986) (transfer tax); N.Y. Tax Law §§ 250-267 (McKinney
1986 & Supp. 1988) (mortgage tax); N.Y. Tax Law §§ 1400-1410 (McKinney 1987) (real
estate transfer tax); N.Y. Tax Law §§ 1440-1449-c (McKinney 1987) (gains tax). See
generally Rifkin, Summary of New York State Gains Tax; Mortgage Recording Tax; New
York City and New York State Real Property Transfer Tax, in Real Property Transfer
Gains Tax 312-45 (1984).
141. An unrecorded interest in real property is not enforceable against a subsequent
purchaser for value. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 32-1-2-11 (Burns Supp. 1986); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 46:22-1 (West 1940); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291 (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1988). If recording, transfer, or gains taxes are not paid, recordation of an interest will
not be allowed. See, e.g., N.Y. Tax Law § 1403(a) (McKinney 1987). See generally
Moonan, The Nature of Title and Estates in New York, in Real Estate Titles 1, 17-20
(1984) (discussing purpose of recording statutes and consequences of failure to record);
Rifkin, Search and Examination of Title, in Real Estate Titles 31, 46-49 (1984) (same).
142. See In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 642,
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interest in real property do so with the assistance of counsel and a real-
tor,143 who are familiar with the complicated scheme of real estate regu-
lation of which request notice provisions form a relatively simple part. It
would be unreasonable to require the state to seek out all interested par-
ties in order to reach those few who refuse to avail themselves of the
benefits of counsel or familiarize themselves with the laws that pertain to
their property interests.
Further support for the constitutionality of request notice provisions is
found in the judicial recognition that in a variety of contexts, the state
can condition the retention of property rights on an affirmative act on the
part of an interested party." In many of these contexts the interested
party receives no more notice than the existence of a statute on the
books.145 Thus, the very existence of request notice provisions suffices to
put parties on notice of the filing requirements." s
The Supreme Court has also stated explicitly that due process rights,
such as the right to notice and a hearing, may be waived. 4 While the
481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (4th Dep't 1984) (Boomer, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, the
author of the Mennonite majority opinion, also wrote the majority opinion in United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985), a decision that upheld the constitutionality of a
statute requiring holders of unpatented mining interests to file an annual notice of intent
to retain their interests. See id. at 108. Justice Marshall wrote that where the plaintiffs'
entire property interest was conditioned upon their meeting the statutory filing require-
ment, "it was incumbent upon them... to have consulted an attorney for legal advice."
Id. at 95.
143. See In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 642,
481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (4th Dep't 1984) (Boomer, J., concurring); cf. United States v.
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) (failure to consult counsel about filing requirement unrea-
sonable where failure to file properly resulted in massive forfeiture of property rights).
144. Seea eg., Locke, 471 U.S. at 106 (state can condition retention of rights of holders
of certain claims on federal lands on filing requirement); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.
516, 530-31 (1982) (state can condition retention of mineral interests on compliance with
statutory filing requirement); Conley v. Barton, 260 U.S. 677, 679, 681-82 (1923) (state
can impose statutory condition of recording an affidavit on mortgagee as part of foreclo-
sure procedure). In Locke, the Court stated that "[e]ven with respect to vested property
rights, a legislature generally has the power to impose new regulatory constraints on the
way in which those rights are used, or to condition their continued retention on perform-
ance of certain affirmative duties." 471 U.S. at 104.
145. See Locke, 471 U.S. at 108 ("legislature generally provides constitutionally ade-
quate process simply by enacting [a] statute"); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532
(1982) ("Generally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law,
and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to
comply."). A statute that is too vague does not provide adequate notice to meet the
requirement of due process. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957).
146. See Alliance Property Management and Dev., Inc. v. Andrews Ave. Equities,
Inc., 133 A.D.2d 30, 34, 518 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (1st Dep't) (Sandier, J., dissenting), aff'd
on other grounds, 70 N.Y.2d 831, 517 N.E.2d 1327, 523 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1987).
147. See D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (execution of note
with cognovit clause, by which it consented to judgment in event of nonpayment, waived
debtor's due process rights to notice and hearing); National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szuk-
hent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (contracting parties may agree to waive due process
requirement of notice); Monsanto Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 753 F.2d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 1985)
(parties may waive due process rights). See generally Rotunda, supra note 6, at 749-53
(discussing waiver of due process rights).
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Court has emphasized that a waiver of constitutional rights must be
knowing and voluntary, 4 ' it has acknowledged that statutory notice can
suffice' 49 and that, in certain circumstances, a waiver can be less than
totally voluntary. 5 ° The existence of request notice statutes and the pre-
sumption that individuals will acquaint themselves with the laws that
govern their real estate transactions satisfy the knowledge require-
ment.'5  Moreover, courts have held that the burden of requesting notice
or a hearing under the fourteenth amendment constitutionally can be
placed on the individual whose rights are affected.' 52 Thus, an interested
party who fails to take the affirmative step of filing a request for notice
has waived her right to receive actual notice. 53
Practically speaking, the burden imposed on a person who will not
receive actual notice of a tax proceeding unless she requests it is not
much different from that imposed on one for whom a statute mandates
unconditional mailed notice. The law imposes on owners and others
with an interest in real property a duty to familiarize themselves and
comply with statutory and common law rules concerning their prop-
erty.' 54 One such rule requires persons liable for the payment of prop-
erty taxes to notify the state of their mailing address when they first
148. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
149. Cf. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1985) (State generally provides suffi-
cient notice "by enacting the statute, publishing it, and ... affording those within the
statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to familiarize themselves with the general
requirements imposed and to comply with those requirements."); Texaco, Inc. v. Short,
454 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1982) (adequate notice given merely by publishing statute and
providing members of public opportunity to acquaint themselves with its provisions).
150. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 703-04 (1982) (finding implied or constructive consent to personal jurisdiction where
party refused to comply with discovery order); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (parent waived right to counsel by failing to express interest in
attending parental termination hearing).
151. See Alliance Property Management and Dev., Inc. v. Andrews Ave. Equities,
Inc.; 133 A.D.2d 30, 33, 518 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (1st Dep't) (Sandier, J., dissenting), aff'd
on other grounds, 70 N.Y.2d 831, 517 N.E.2d 1327, 523 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1987); In re Tax
Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 227, 514 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (2d Dep't), appeal
dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 694, 512 N.E.2d 556, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1987).
152. See United States v. An Article of Device "Theramatic", 715 F.2d 1339, 1343
(9th Cir. 1983) (burden could be placed on defendant to request hearing in seizure case),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d at 227, 514
N.Y.S.2d at 394 (burden could be placed on property owner to request notice in tax
foreclosure).
153. See Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d at 227, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
154. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1985); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454
U.S. 516, 533 (1982); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925);
Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 254-55 (1907); Bender v. City of Rochester, 765 F.2d 7,
11-12 (2d Cir. 1985); Township of Brick v. Block 48-7, Lots 34, 35, 36, 202 N.J. Super.
246, 249, 494 A.2d 829, 832 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2181 (1987); Sheehan v.
County of Suffolk, 67 N.Y.2d 52, 58, 490 N.E.2d 523, 525, 499 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658, cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1006 (1986); Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. County of Sulli-
van, 59 N.Y.2d 418, 423, 452 N.E.2d 1207, 1211, 465 N.Y.S.2d 879, 883 (1983);
Girrbach v. Levine, 132 A.D.2d 41, 43, 522 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277-78 (3d Dep't 1987).
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purchase real property,' 55 and to keep taxing authorities apprised of
changes in their address in order to receive tax bills and notice of tax
proceedings. 56 Thus, while all states require actual notice of an impend-
ing tax foreclosure to property owners,' 7 this notice is, in effect, condi-
tioned on the owners' keeping the taxing authorities abreast of their
whereabouts, an affirmative step analogous to requesting notice.
Two factors that the Mennonite majority considered important also
weigh in favor of the constitutionality of request notice provisions. First,
in holding publication an insufficient form of notice in tax sale proceed-
ings, the Court emphasized that it was unreasonable to expect an inter-
ested party to "keep abreast of" published or posted notices,1 58 on the
one hand, or constantly to inquire into the tax delinquent status of a
piece of real property, on the other. 5 9 In contrast, the requirement of
filing a request for notice is a simple act, which, once accomplished,
guarantees mailed notice of a tax sale."6° Further, as Justice O'Connor
emphasized in her dissent, the fourteenth amendment does not obligate
the state to save parties who unreasonably fail to safeguard their own
property interests.' 6' Second, the Mennonite Court focused on the un-
reasonableness of a statute that made no provision whatsoever for actual
155. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 11-416 (1986).
156. See Township of Brick v. Block 48-7, Lots 34, 35, 36, 202 N.J. Super. 246, 249,
494 A.2d 829, 832 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S. CL 2181 (1987); Girrbach v. Levine, 132
A.D.2d 41, 43, 522 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277-78 (3d Dep't 1987); cf. Bender v. City of Roches-
ter, 588 F. Supp. 1405, 1408 (finding administrator of estate had duty to apprise tax
authorities of property owner's death) (W.D.N.Y. 1984), affirmed, 765 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1985).
157. Statutes that provide for actual notice to owners generally state that it should be
mailed to their "last known address;" they make no provision for seeking out such per-
sons whose addresses have changed but who have not informed the taxing authorities.
See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 6-1.1-24-4 (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1986); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax
Law § 1002(4) (McKinney Supp. 1988); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-9-10 (Supp. 1987); S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. § 10-23-2.1 (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1363 (1987); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 32, § 5252 (1981); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3965 (1984). But see N.Y.C. Admin-
Code § 11-416 (1986) (notice only to those owners who have filed owners' registration
card).
158. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983).
159. See id. at 799-800.
160. See supra note 44. The New York State and New York City provisions are
unique in that they specifically uphold the validity of a foreclosure that takes place after a
failure to send, in the case of the state, or receive, in the case of the city, notice. See N.Y.
Real Prop. Tax Law § 1126 (McKinney 1972); N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 11-416, 11417
(1986). The state provision is the more egregious of the two, since it, in effect, tells mort-
gagees "that their efforts to receive notice of pending tax foreclosure proceedings by filing
their names and addresses with the taxing authorities may be meaningless, since the tax-
ing authorities may ignore the filing without consequence." In re Foreclosure of Tax
Liens by the County of Erie, 103 A.D.2d 636, 640-41, 481 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (4th Dep't
1984) (Boomer, J., concurring).
161. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 809 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); cf. Weigner v. City of
New York, 852 F.2d 646, 651 (2d Cir. 1988) (Delinquent taxpayer "can reasonably be
expected to know that foreclosure is imminent and to take the steps necessary to protect
her interests.").
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notice. 162 Request notice provisions offer interested parties a simple
method of assuring themselves of notice "reasonably calculated to ap-
prise [them] of a pending tax sale."' 1 63 This distinction is of constitu-
tional significance.
CONCLUSION
Although individuals have a constitutional right to receive notice of
proceedings that will affect their interests in property, the Supreme
Court's modem due process jurisprudence emphasizes reasonableness,
flexibility and a balancing of interests under the totality of the circum-
stances. Given the gravity of the state's interest in real property taxation,
request notice provisions strike a reasonable balance between the individ-
ual's constitutional right to receive notice of an impending tax sale and
the state's need to collect delinquent property taxes inexpensively and
expeditiously.
Ellen F. Friedman
162. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798, 799.
163. Id. at 798.
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